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The Red and the Black: 
The Sandinistas and the Nicaraguan Revolution 
Introduction 
In July 1979 the Frente Sandinista de Liberation Nacional (FSLN) came to 
power in Nicaragua on the crest of a wave of popular insurrection which ended 
over four decades of the Somoza family dictatorship. On 25 February 1990, in 
an election the FSLN organised and expected to win easily, the Frente 
Sandinista suffered a decisive defeat. This defeat, at the hands of a coalition 
generally viewed as associated with the US-funded contras, represented a 
spectacular victory for US policy in Nicaragua. The implications of the election 
for the cause of progressive change in Nicaragua were much more complex. On 
the one hand, the Frente Sandinista fought and ruled under the banner of 
nationalism, taking an uncompromising stand for Nicaragua's independence from 
US domination. In its rhetoric and through many of its early policies it 
committed itself to the struggles of the lower classes. At the ideological level the 
defeat was presented as a victory of pro-imperialist and economically reactionary 
policies. On the other hand, for a decade the Frente Sandinista obfuscated class 
politics and served as a barrier to effective mass participation, rendering its 
electoral defeat ambiguous with regard to the struggle for progressive change in 
Nicaragua. 
Political movements rarely conform closely in practice to their ideological 
rhetoric. In the Middle Ages peasant insurrections characteristically adopted the 
ideology of religious purification, or millenarianism, but they were usually 
struggles against repressive authority.1 During the nineteenth century most 
independence movements in Spanish America adopted the ideology of the rights 
of 'man', inspired by the French and North American Revolutions. Virtually 
without exception the oligarchs and merchant classes that led these struggles had 
little interest in implementing the principles of bourgeois equality.2 In Africa in 
the 1950s and 1960s government after government replaced the colonial masters, 
professing a commitment to African Socialism; then with few exceptions those 
governments fostered capitalist development. In each epoch the call for change 
adapts to itself the radical rhetoric of the time. It is not surprising then that the 
Frente Sandinista would define itself as Marxist; all the more since this rhetoric 
represented the antithesis of the ideology of the government of the United States, 
which played a crucial role in maintaining the Somoza dictatorship. This is not 
to say that the Sandinistas were not socialists; but their use of the language of 
Marxism and Leninism did not mean that they were. Words are a form of the 
ideology of politics, not the essence of political struggle. 
The construction of socialism entails more than use of rhetoric or invoking 
ideological abstraction. Like Liberalism and Fascism, 'Socialism' implies 
particular systems of political, economic and social organisation, however 
fraught with ambiguity and debate these may be. While each political form has 
its variations, each also has a core of practice that differentiates it from the 
others and gives to it a concrete reality beyond the abstraction of words. The 
Somozas called themselves democrats, yet few if any believed they were. It 
would be equally in error to accept the self-definition of the Sandinistas without 
analysing that label in terms of their practice. 
Analysis of the Nicaraguan revolution has tended to accept the Sandinista 
movement's definition of itself as Marxist, or some form of revolutionary 
socialist, and then construct history backwards. In this retrospective method, the 
triumph of socialist revolution becomes the pivotal event in Nicaraguan history 
from which all other events are interpreted, backwards and forwards. In this 
approach the key issue of pre-1979 Nicaraguan history became how a 
revolutionary situation arose which produced the triumph of a socialist 
movement. Emphasis tended to focus on the construction of the class alliance 
that made this triumph possible. Since many contended that the latter days of 
Sandinista rule involved policies more capitalist than socialist, analysis of post-
1979 events often sought to explain when and why the putative revolutionary 
transformation failed to follow its radical course. From this perspective 
normative judgements, apologies and recriminations tended to abound. 
Our interpretation breaks with the approaches described above and attempts 
to read Nicaraguan history chronologically. Our purpose is to understand the 
manner in which Nicaraguan society, in particular the rural sector, was 
revolutionised in the 1980s. To do this we suggest an analysis of class and 
ideological transformations before, during and after the Sandinista decade. This 
task is made difficult both because of the ambiguities and contradictions of the 
revolutionary process and because analysis of Nicaraguan social history is in its 
infancy. The Sandinistas themselves, as well as most writers sympathetic with 
their cause, contextualised their struggle almost exclusively within a narrative 
of US imperialism. As such, their analysis of class relations and social 
transformation generally was pro forma and of questionable veracity. In addition, 
debate on the class nature of Nicaragua was hampered by the paucity of research 
on Nicaraguan social history. With the conviction that the Sandinista Revolution 
is incomprehensible if abstracted from the history of Nicaraguan social change, 
we develop an interpretation of the Sandinista decade that begins with an 
analysis of the continuities and discontinuities of the country's past. 
We treat the revolution of 1979 as a moment in the sweep of Nicaraguan 
history in which the tendencies inherent in that history came to dramatic and 
violent expression, but not to an end. The forces that carried the country to 
1979, which swept along the Frente Sandinista de Liberation Nacional with the 
rest of society, continued their unfolding through the 1980s and into the 1990s. 
An essential characteristic of Nicaraguan society, virtually since colonial times, 
was the deep and apparently unbridgeable divisions within the dominant classes. 
These divisions assumed different forms over time, but remained an essential 
ingredient of the political process through the 1990s. The triumph of the 
Sandinistas derived in part from this division and enabled the FSLN to rule for 
a decade with no coherent class base. The Somozas, too, ruled by virtue of the 
divisions within the dominant classes, albeit in a profoundly different way. Both 
of these regimes, the dictatorial and the populist, were exceptional in the sense 
that they held power with ambiguous class bases, though there the similarity 
ended. The Somoza dynasty was exceptional in that it served the interest of 
landowners and capital in the long run while frequently incurring the wrath of 
many, and in the end most, within the dominant classes. 
The Sandinista regime's exceptionality proved much more complex, defying 
brief encapsulation. It derived from the interrelation of three characteristics. 
First, the FSLN successfully carried out a national liberation struggle, an armed 
conflict the purpose of which was to liberate Nicaragua from foreign domination 
by the overthrow of a US surrogate regime headed by the Somoza family. 
Second, this conflict enlisted the support of the vast majority of the Nicaraguan 
people in a loose alliance with minimal formal organisation. And third, the 
ambiguous class base and loose organisational structure of the insurrection 
reflected the dominant social relations within Nicaragua. Capitalism was vibrant 
but incipient in the Somozas' Nicaragua, and the classes of modern bourgeois 
society, the proletariat and the capitalist, remained at an early stage of formation. 
In the countryside the social structure included many forms of non-capitalist 
relations of production out of which arose a multitude of often inconsistent 
political demands during and after the insurrectionary struggle. 
Reflecting its complex and chaotic character, the insurrection that overthrew 
the Somoza dynasty produced major and irreversible changes. In part from the 
pressure of external aggression and in part from the revolutionary dynamic 
inherent in the insurrection, two processes profoundly transformed Nicaragua. 
The propertied classes, divided at the outset of the insurrection, became 
progressively weaker during the 1980s, less and less able to impose a new 
regime that could carry out an effective counter-revolution. Related to this, but 
potentially more profound, struggles of small rural producers and the landless 
transformed agrarian society. At the outset of the insurrection a multitude of 
forms of servile class relations involving share-cropping, tenantry, debt and 
patron-client bonds dominated the countryside, existing alongside and 
overlapping with free wage labour. By the end of the 1980s, after redistribution 
of land and a fundamental decline in the power of the traditional landlord class, 
servile class relations existed as an exception. A majority, but still far from all, 
of the rural population had acquired direct access to land. 
In this context it is important to specify the sense in which we employ the 
concept 'peasantry'. We understand peasants to be small rural producers 
enmeshed in subordinate, exploitative and non-capitalist class relations with 
larger landowners. We do not apply the term in general to small scale 
agricultural producers, rural proletarians, or the rural poor. Using this definition, 
we encapsulate the dominant change of the Sandinista Revolution as the 
transformation of rural Nicaragua from a society of peasants (campesinos) and 
landlords (patrones) to a society of farmers, small and large. Put simply, the 
Sandinistas presided over the demise of an agrarian class order in which 
patronage characterised the generalised social form, and which crudely might be 
called feudal or seigneurial. These two changes, decline of the power of the 
dominant classes and the rise of the small farmer, produced a radically different 
Nicaragua over the course of a decade. As we shall see, both of these changes 
occurred largely outside the control of the Sandinista leadership. 
Our argument about the class nature of pre-revolutionary Nicaragua is 
contentious. The prevailing view, which acquired the status of official Sandinista 
dogma, is that prior to 1979 Nicaragua was definitively capitalist.3 According 
to this interpretation President Jose Santos Zelaya (1893-1909), or at the latest 
Somoza Garcia (1936-1954), ushered in the rule of capital in Nicaragua; and by 
1979 most of the economically active population in the countryside were rural 
proletarians. We develop an alternative interpretation and periodisation of 
Nicaraguan history.4 
The foregoing argument is presented in several parts. First, we briefly analyse 
the divisions within the dominant classes in Nicaragua and the implications of 
their fragmentation. Second, we suggest an interpretation of the dominant social 
and economic characteristics of Nicaragua prior to the revolution, arguing that 
due to the prevalence of relations of servitude in the countryside Nicaragua was 
far more underdeveloped than is commonly argued. Next we examine the 
revolutionary changes in the rural class structure. There then follows a 
discussion of the ideology of the Frente Sandinista, which, we contend, 
constituted a programme of populist reform whose essential ingredient was 
nationalism. The foregoing allows for analysis of the electoral defeat of the 
Sandinistas in February 1990, the response of the Frente to its defeat, and the 
nature of the Chamorro regime that followed the Sandinistas. The final section 
considers whether the transformations that occurred in the 1980s were reversible. 
A central conclusion from our analysis is that throughout the years of its rule the 
Frente sought an alliance with factions of the previously dominant classes in 
order to consolidate its populist programme, but only in defeat achieved that 
alliance in effective form. 
The FSLN and the Tide of History 
The Sandinistas represented a continuation of tendencies of the past, and, at the 
same time, presided over a fundamental rupture with traditional class relations. 
Two aspects of Nicaraguan history are central to understanding this dialectical 
role of the FSLN: the historic divisions within the dominant classes and the 
prevalence of servile, patriarchal relations of production in the countryside. Prior 
treatments of the Sandinistas have, in our view, given insufficient emphasis to 
these two aspects of Nicaraguan history.5 
For a number of reasons, history forged in Nicaragua propertied classes 
divided and incapable of imposing coherent rule over the country.6 The 
weakness of the propertied classes derived not merely from the absence of 
strength and unity, but represented a changing yet enduring process of 
divisiveness, manifested in armed conflicts which continuously devastated the 
country from independence until the creation of the Somoza regime. After 
formal independence, these armed conflicts frequently were associated with 
elements of the propertied classes seeking the intervention of outside agents, 
usually from the United States, to shift the balance of power within Nicaragua. 
Thus, these divisions explain, in part, critical moments during which North 
American armed forces intervened to alter the course of Nicaraguan history. The 
most important of these was the creation and maintenance of the Somoza 
dynasty whose antithesis was the triumph of the Sandinista revolution. 
The fragmentation and weakness of the propertied classes in Nicaragua called 
forth US intervention, not the reverse, for it served the immediate interests of 
sectors of the dominant classes in both countries.7 The traditional political 
division within the propertied classes in Nicaragua, between Liberals and 
Conservatives, originally had a geographical basis, centred on the landowning 
families in Leon and Granada respectively. During the forty years after 
independence the propertied classes in Nicaragua fought among themselves 
almost unceasingly. This armed conflict represented elite contests over control 
of the state as such rather than ideological or economic differences. Although 
weak and impoverished, the state apparatus held out the promise of enrichment 
more than agriculture or commerce. Because the country lay at the margin of a 
backwater within Latin America, these productive activities provided limited 
scope for the accumulation of wealth. 
After the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850, Central America, particularly 
Nicaragua, fell into the US sphere of influence, realising the geopolitical 
ambitions formally but ineffectively asserted in the Monroe Doctrine twenty-
seven years earlier. The first significant intervention in Central America, 
involving the infamous William Walker, took the form of a private enterprise 
engaged by Nicaraguan Liberals embroiled in an armed conflict with their 
Conservative rivals.8 After the Liberals hired the North American adventurer 
to shift the balance of power in their favour, pre-existing partisan divisions grew 
intensely bitter. Following the rout of Walker's army at the Battle of San 
Jacinto, the Liberal Party fell into disgrace, and fell from political power until 
Jose Santos Zelaya took the presidency in 1893. After Walker, who enjoyed its 
tacit support, the US government assumed direct control over armed 
interventions, all of which were characterised by close coordination with 
elements of the Nicaraguan elite. 
In 1909 Washington provided military assistance to the Conservatives, which 
culminated in a coup that toppled Zelaya. Despite US military and economic 
support, the Conservative faction proved incapable of asserting its hegemony 
over the propertied classes, much less the Nicaraguan masses. There followed 
twenty-five years of US military occupation during which Nicaragua was ruled 
as a de facto US protectorate.9 Into the early 1930s, Washington's domination 
of the country contributed to the prolongation of a bloody civil war. While this 
war began as a conflict within the elite, it evolved into a peasant insurrection 
under the leadership of Augusto 'Cesar' Sandino.10 With the success of 
Sandino's struggle, the primary function of the US occupying forces became the 
protection of the dominant classes as a whole against the revolutionary demands 
of the Nicaraguan peasantry. Notwithstanding the underlying class character of 
the civil war, the landowning and political elite remained deeply divided and 
unable to forge cohesive class rule over the populace. 
US military occupation in the 1920s and early 1930s engendered considerable 
opposition, both in Nicaragua and in the United States. But unlike in the 
Philippines a decade earlier, the US war against the nationalist and populist 
movement led by Sandino did not prove effective in establishing stability under 
Washington's domination. Faced with the remarkable success of Sandino's 
guerrilla army, in the 1920s strategists in the US State Department sought to 
create a government for Nicaragua which would end the necessity of US direct 
military intervention, as well as overcome or by-pass the divisions within the 
elite that contributed to political instability. The solution, which involved 
creating a trained 'professional' army, did not overcome the intra-elite divisions 
but was imposed above them, suppressing rather than resolving a century of 
intra-elite conflict." The new US policy was implemented in 1927 with the 
creation of the National Guard and the appointment of Anastasio Somoza Garcia 
as its commander, to serve as the local agent of US oversight of Nicaragua. 
With continued US sponsorship Somoza Garcia was elected president of 
Nicaragua in 1936, after demonstrating his utility by assassinating Sandino and 
brutally repressing the peasant movement. Far from forging unity of the 
propertied classes, Somoza Garcia nurtured those divisions as part of his 
successful strategy to consolidate power.12 The stability and longevity of the 
Somoza regime, in which power passed from father to older son (Luis Somoza 
Debayle), to younger son (Anastasio Somoza Debayle, Tachito'), derived from 
fostering divisions within the dominant classes while containing the conflicts 
those divisions generated.13 This strategy, requiring a subtle balancing of 
alliances and antagonisms, was implemented with considerably more success by 
the father and elder son than by Tachito', who more often than not substituted 
force for finesse. 
Social stability under the Somozas, achieved by a mixture of political guile 
and brutal repression when necessary, facilitated rapid economic growth from 
which most factions of the elite derived considerable benefit.14 At the same 
time, the suppressed but smouldering political divisions within the dominant 
classes debilitated opposition to the regime. This contradictory relationship, 
economic benefits combined with political manipulation, was made explicit in 
several formal agreements between the Somozas and the elite opposition. The 
most famous of these, El Facto de los Generates of 1950, responded to 
opposition demands by providing an appearance of power-sharing without 
substance. Because intra-elite conflicts did not erupt into violence, the Somoza 
years were popularly regarded, even during the Sandinista decade, as a 
prolonged period of peace; albeit a peace often brutally imposed. It appeared 
that the Somozas were responsible for that peace by suppressing and repressing 
intra-elite warfare. This was achieved through timely political alliances in 
combination with personal control of the armed forces which ensured the 
Somozas a monopoly on state-sponsored violence. But it may be that that truce 
coincided with rather than was caused by the Somozas' regime. Sandino's 
insurrection threatened all propertied groups with its potential for radical change, 
even though that potential went unrealised. The first Somoza, a creation of the 
US government, eliminated agrarian radicalism as a threat and achieved for his 
opponents within the elite what they could not do for themselves. Therefore, 
Sandino's peasant war may have had a dampening effect on intra-elite struggles 
by rendering them secondary to the threat of mass uprising. The savagely 
repressed peasant insurrection in El Salvador in 1932, coinciding with the end 
of Sandino's struggle, may have reinforced a collective class consciousness 
among propertied groups in Nicaragua, as it certainly did in El Salvador.15 The 
elite opposition to the Somoza dynasty must be set alongside the service 
provided by the dictatorship in maintaining the rule of the propertied classes. 
This tension, between opposition to dynastic rule and support for many of the 
practices of the dictatorial regime, made the elite opposition ambiguous and 
frequently half-hearted. With considerable cause, the Sandinistas would later 
accuse the propertied classes of seeking to create 4Somocismo sin Somoza\ 
The nature of the Somozas' rule as well as elite opposition to their 
governments changed considerably over the course of the forty-three year 
dynasty, all the while generally reproducing the form of the traditional political 
division between Liberals and Conservatives.16 Because Somoza Garcia 
fashioned the Partido Liberal Nacionalista as the centerpiece and symbol of the 
regime's political power, which claimed a heritage with the Liberals of the past, 
the elite opposition tended to identify itself with the Conservatives.17 These 
labels bore an even more tenuous relation to ideology or economics than did 
those of the original parties. Nevertheless, it remained the case that many 
prominent opposition families claimed Granada as their region of origin, the 
Chamorros being the most illustrious example.18 The critical issue, however, 
is what, if anything, lay beneath this increasingly stylised dichotomy. 
Some have suggested that the divisions within the propertied classes could be 
explained in terms of size of enterprise and the economic activities in which 
landlords and capitalists were engaged.19 While logically compelling, our 
research suggests that by the 1960s and 1970s elite support or opposition to the 
regime depended simply on whether and how a family's enterprises were grafted 
into the economic networks controlled by the ruling family. And these 
relationships criss-crossed Nicaraguan society, tying medium and large producers 
of an assortment of exports to the fortunes of the regime. However, not all elite 
opposition to the regime stemmed so directly from economic self-interest. For 
many within what often is called the 'bourgeois opposition to Somoza', 
bourgeois represented an ideological vision rather than their material reality and 
social experience. They aspired to forge a modern, bourgeois-democratic 
Nicaragua; a country freed from the anachronistic social and political structures 
which were associated with the dictatorship. 
To a degree, the propertied classes' antagonism to the dynasty grew in 
relation to the decreasing political skill and increasing ruthlessness of the 
founder's successors. Even the appearance of sharing political power with the 
elite opposition ended under the final Somoza, Anastasio Debayle. Possibly of 
greater significance was the reluctance of this last Somoza to share with the 
landowners and industrialists not within his close circle of supporters and 
sycophants the gains from rapid economic growth and the windfalls from 
disaster relief which followed the earthquake of 1972. Although from the outset 
of the dictatorship the state was used to expand the Somozas' businesses, this 
practice became more blatant and extreme under 'Tachito'.20 Like others, we 
note the apparently decreasing political skill of the succeeding Somozas. This 
should be seen as effect rather than cause. Somoza Garcia ruled during a period 
when extended dictatorships in Central America and the Caribbean were 
considerably more common than in the 1960s, much less the 1970s. Every 
country in Central America, except Costa Rica, suffered under brutal and 
capacious 'strongmen' from the early 1930s to the mid-1940s. Of the four, only 
Somoza Garcra survived past 1948. To some degree this can be attributed to his 
political guile.21 However, by 1956, when Somoza Garcia fell to an assassin's 
fire, caudillo-style dictatorships had become an anachronism even in Central 
America where despotism reigned. By 1967, when Anastasio Somoza Debayle 
inherited the dynasty upon the death of his brother Luis, the Nicaraguan dynasty 
had become an anomaly in the Western Hemisphere.22 Thus, when the Somoza 
regime collapsed in July 1979, what is significant is not only how its overthrow 
was achieved, but that it lasted so long.23 
Part of the explanation for the regime's longevity was the ambiguity of the 
elite opposition with respect to its demise. In addition to its internal divisions, 
the elite opposition feared an insurrectionary struggle that would radically 
transform Nicaraguan society in the process of disposing of the dictator. In 
particular, while the propertied classes may have viewed the Somocista National 
Guard as the bulwark of dynastic despotism, that same Guard represented the 
protection against a post-Somoza regime in which their power and property 
would be threatened. Faced with the complex task of removing the dictator 
while maintaining at least in part the repressive apparatus of the state, the elite 
opposition drew back from armed insurrection, preferring a strategy in which 
Somoza's departure would be achieved by a change in US policy. To 
accomplish this, the leading figures of the opposition repeatedly petitioned the 
US Embassy in Managua and policymakers in Washington to abandon support 
of the Somoza regime, with singular lack of success. The elite's unwillingness 
to rupture its ties with Washington became critical to the outcome of the anti-
dictatorial struggle. In 1977, the Department of State informed a delegation 
representing the Nicaraguan business community that US policy remained in 
support of Somoza. This had the effect of undermining elite opposition. Only 
after the murder of the leading spokesman of the elite opposition, Pedro Joaquin 
Chamorro, by Somocista agents did large sectors of the propertied classes 
seriously consider tolerating, even supporting, armed struggle to end the dynasty. 
To this end, fractions of the elite formed an alliance with the Frente Sandinista 
de Liberation Nacional, the group that had established itself as having the only 
viable strategy to overthrow the dictatorship: armed struggle in defiance of US 
support for the regime. Unlike in El Salvador and Guatemala, where the 
propertied classes historically united in defence of their power and privilege, in 
Nicaragua the propertied classes were traditionally divided. The divisiveness of 
the Nicaraguan dominant class proved the key to the Sandinista triumph. 
The FSLN was founded in 1960 by middle class university students who 
opposed the Somoza dynasty as well as the tactics of traditional politicians, 
whether Liberal, Conservative, or Socialist. Inspired by the Cuban Revolution 
and Sandino, it espoused Che Guevara's focista theory of guerrilla warfare. 
Following this strategy, the FSLN established guerrilla columns in the mountains 
of north-central Nicaragua. During this stage of its struggle, which lasted until 
the middle 1970s, the Sandinistas gained little popular support, nor did they 
enjoy military success. However, 1978 proved a turning point. A series of 
successful and sensationalistic military actions transformed the Sandinistas from 
a rather insignificant political force to national heroes and heroines. This, in 
conjunction with events outside the control of the FSLN, such as the 
assassination of Chamorro, resulted in the formation of an anti-dictatorial 
alliance between one faction of the Sandinistas (the Terceristas, led by Daniel 
and Humberto Ortega) and the elite opposition to Somoza Debayle.24 Partly by 
virtue of their independence from Washington, and partly because of their 
successful armed actions, the Sandinistas were hailed by the population as 
leaders of the struggle against the dictatorship.25 By 1979 even the propertied 
classes grudgingly recognised their vanguard role. 
After the US government failed to negotiate with Somoza a transition that 
would exclude the FSLN from power, the Sandinistas and representatives of the 
propertied classes forged a government that institutionalised the anti-Somoza 
alliance. The popular following of the Sandinistas and disintegration of the 
National Guard left the FSLN dominant militarily and forced the United States 
and the Nicaraguan elite to accept this governing junta as a fait accompli. In a 
move that would come back to haunt them, the Sandinistas chose Violeta 
Chamorro, widow of Pedro Joaquin, as one of the two representatives of the 
elite opposition on the junta. Never robust, the alliance between the Sandinistas 
and the propertied classes grew increasingly fragile. Successive representatives 
of the business community resigned from the junta, denouncing the Sandinistas 
as crypto-communists, and allied themselves with the US-funded contra.26 As 
the alliance unravelled many wealthy Nicaraguans fled to Miami to await the 
'liberation' of Nicaragua.27 
However, a small but significant minority of the propertied classes remained 
in alliance with the Sandinistas, though inside the Frente.28 Members of the 
elite took leading positions in the Sandinista government, particularly visible in 
their responsibility for the economy and national finance. This, coupled with 
flexibility and inconsistency in Sandinista economic policy, prompted more 
hesitant members of the propertied classes to limited cooperation with the 
Sandinistas on the basis of pragmatic self-interest.29 Over the course of the 
1980s divisions within the propertied classes widened. Instead of achieving unity 
with the goal of re-establishing its class rule, the traditional ruling groups 
experienced increased disagreement over how to relate to the Sandinistas. By 
1989 they were in such disarray that the US Embassy intervened directly to 
bring together a slate to oppose the Sandinistas in the elections of February 
1991. 
The ambiguous attitude of the propertied classes towards the Sandinistas 
reflected their historical divisions, but also differences in political outlook of 
factions within the FSLN itself. Propagandistic stereotyping characterised the 
FSLN as a dedicated, cohesive revolutionary party intent upon the socialist 
transformation of Nicaragua. 
The classes of modern bourgeois society - proletariat and capitalist - were 
not fully developed in the Somozas' Nicaragua. This is not to argue that neither 
existed; but they had yet to become the generalised social form in the 1960s and 
1970s. This conditioned the nature of the Sandinista Revolution. 
One hundred years before the Sandinista Revolution, a fundamental but 
quieter revolution transformed class relations in the Nicaraguan countryside. 
That social change was associated with the expansion of coffee production for 
export and the institutionalisation of coerced labour systems. Large coffee 
growers, together with the state, created various forms of unfree labour to force 
the rural poor to pick their coffee as the beans matured. By 1900 rural people 
in the coffee zones without property or profession were compelled to register 
with local officials and to work for large growers during the annual harvest. This 
system, matriculation, ordered class relations in the Departments of Granada, 
Carazo, and Managua from the rise of coffee in the 1870s through the first two 
decades of the twentieth century. As coffee production transformed class and 
property relations the nature of matriculation changed. By the 1920s 
matriculation became more private than public. Real, fictive, and coerced 
indebtedness gradually replaced government fiat in ensuring its continuation.30 
Then the government of Anastasio Somoza Garcia outlawed matriculation and 
over time the system fell into disuse, replaced in the main by social relations 
based on patronage. Notwithstanding this change, the legacy of coercive class 
relations continued to characterise the Nicaraguan countryside, but in an extra-
official form. 
The development of cotton production in the 1950s, concentrated around Leon 
and Chinandega, caused a transformation of social relations towards capitalism. 
In this region cotton growers evicted share-croppers, tenants and debt peons 
from lands they had occupied for generations.31 This dispossession resulted in 
a marked increase in the degree of rural proletarianisation. Nevertheless, 
traditional forms of dominance, subservience, and relations of reciprocity still 
played important roles in the social organisation of labour and in class relations 
in the countryside, even in the regions surrounding Leon and Chinandega. 
Repercussions from the changes in the cotton zone were limited in other regions 
of the country where patriarchal and servile bonds continued to dominate class 
relations. Men and women who migrated seasonally to harvest cotton, coffee and 
sugar frequently depended upon relations of patronage within their villages to 
give them access to land to plant their subsistence corn and beans. While the 
increasing importance of cotton had major consequences for the demand for 
labour, it did not bring about a radical restructuring of social relations in the 
Pacific and Central regions of Nicaragua, nor did it cause a fundamental rupture 
with servile labour systems. During the Somoza regimes rural production 
became increasingly monetised, as landlords and capitalists enjoyed a freer hand 
in expelling labour from the land. However, the Somozas did not fundamentally 
alter the social control of the landlord class over rural society, despite the 
regime's conflicts with elements of the propertied elite. This characterisation 
does not deny that capitalist social relations were on the rise. Our major point, 
and it is a controversial one, is that the buying and selling of the means of 
production and of labour power were not the predominant social forms before 
the Sandinista Revolution.32 
Before 1979 Nicaraguan society was predominately agrarian and the 
complexities and contradictions inherent in the emergence of capitalist 
agriculture were rife. Courting risks implied by generalisation, we suggest that 
capitalist farmers were few in number and relied on systems of labour that 
combined and juxtaposed free wage labour with servile, non-capitalist relations. 
Seasonal harvest workers tended to be in capitalist wage relations while 
permanent labourers were ensconsed within ties of patronage. In the agro-export 
sector, where capitalism was more highly developed, producers relied on large 
numbers of temporary wage labourers to harvest cotton, coffee and sugar. 
Among these were Nicaragua's rural proletarians. But even here, most migrant 
workers returned to their villages after the round of harvests to plant small 
parcels of land, more often than not acquired outside of market mechanisms. 
They were impoverished but not separated from access to land. They might be 
called 'semi-proletarians'. We do not use this term, however, because it is 
associated with viewing workers and social relations in isolation from class 
relations in the society as a whole. Prime examples of capitalist enterprises were 
the large modern cotton, sugar, and cattle estates of the Somozas and the 
Nicaragua Sugar Estates Ltd. (Ingenio San Antonio) owned by leading 
opponents of the regime. Labour relations and class consciousness even in these 
enterprises involved the amalgam of free wage labour and patron-client ties.33 
Medium sized producers, of whom there were relatively many in Nicaragua, 
tended to favour personal ties over the market in labour power to acquire their 
work force.34 They were commodity producers, but often their access to land, 
agricultural inputs, industrial processing, finance, a market for their products, as 
well as to workers was mediated through multiple relations of patronage which 
underpinned the class structures of rural society. 
No clear separation existed between capitalist and non-capitalist sectors in the 
Nicaraguan economy, nor between bourgeois and traditional landowners within 
the Nicaraguan agrarian elite at the end of the Somoza era. Cotton, sugar and 
rice production were more capitalist, coffee and cattle tended to be less so, the 
production of corn and beans rarely ever. Nevertheless, it is artificial to construct 
a political or class typology of the propertied rural elite based on product, 
geography, political preference, or size of landholding. Neither is it fruitful to 
pursue the line of argument that the more, or the less, capitalist members of the 
elite supported, or opposed, the regime. The politics of the regime and the 
process of the emergence of capitalism in Nicaragua were too complex to allow 
for such generalisations. The Somoza dynasty created conditions which 
promoted the development of capitalism at the same time as it rested on a social 
fabric of patron-client relations which were woven into all layers of society. 
These relations hindered the development of generalised commodity production. 
The importance of servile labour relations prior to the overthrow of the 
Somoza dynasty helps to explain the revolutionary nature of the Sandinista 
decade. While many writers have stressed the changes in rural social relations 
under the Sandinistas, the importance of the revolution's elimination of class 
domination in the countryside has been insufficiently appreciated.35 The 
Sandinista agrarian reform, more by accident than design, transformed the 
peasantry into a class of small farmers. 
The Difference the Revolution Made 
A major and irreversible revolution transformed Nicaragua during the rule of the 
Sandinistas, though largely outside its control; indeed, to an extent it occurred 
contrary to the stated goals of the Direction Nacional (National Directorate). At 
least two inter-related revolutionary changes occurred in Nicaragua in the 1980s 
which permanently altered society: the historically divided dominant classes 
suffered a major weakening of their economic and political power, such that for 
the foreseeable future it would be doubtful that they could assert hegemony over 
the country; and in the countryside social relations that subordinated the 
peasantry were largely destroyed, creating a class of small farmers. Neither of 
these fundamental changes conformed closely to the design of the leadership of 
the FSLN; perhaps the first to a degree, but certainly not the second. 
The hypothesis that the Sandinistas planned from the outset to dispossess the 
capitalists and landlords was one of the many myths of the Nicaraguan 
revolution whose tenacity derived from its emotional appeal to both the right and 
the left, and from taking at face value the rhetoric employed by the Sandinista 
leadership.36 The political right inside and outside the country sought a 
Nicaragua in which the dominant classes would be free to assert their will over 
workers and peasants. Historically central to this reactionary social order had 
been US domination of the country. In this scheme of things it would be 
inconceivable that the anti-Americanism of the Sandinistas could imply anything 
but uncompromising hostility to the propertied classes and to capitalism itself. 
For the left, particularly outside Nicaragua, all tensions between the Sandinista 
government and the propertied classes gave evidence of the radical course of the 
revolution. 
This interpretation equated Sandinista hostility towards the propertied classes 
with a commitment to revolutionary socialism. Hostility certainly existed, and 
intensified through the 1980s. But it did not derive from a Marxist programme 
- though at times some Sandinista leaders articulated their hostility in such 
terms. Rather, it reflected the Sandinistas' correct observation that members of 
the propertied classes were especially prone to endorse the campaign of counter-
revolution. In the eyes of the Sandinistas those who supported this campaign 
committed treason, and the traitors could be found in disproportionate numbers 
among the capitalists and landlords. Their crime was not exploitation of workers 
and peasants, but rather betrayal of the fatherland. For exploitation they could 
be forgiven, even aided in carrying it out, if done in moderation and in the 
interest of the revolution. For the latter offence there could be no forgiveness. 
Thus, the government's threat to private property was not economically 
motivated, but politically. In place of the communist slogan, 'expropriate the 
expropriators', the leadership of the FSLN demanded, 'expropriate the traitors'. 
In the Nicaraguan revolution all patriots found welcome within the coalition of 
the 'majority', regardless of class; and all traitors were excluded, regardless of 
class; in all cases the welcome was conditional upon accepting the leadership of 
the National Directorate. 
Sandinista economic strategy, in so far as a coherent one existed, involved a 
populist programme in which the state would serve as a vehicle for redistributing 
income and guide the accumulation process. The government employed 
redistributive measures common to populist regimes throughout Latin America 
in the post-World War II period. One of the more radical measures was a decree 
effectively abolishing urban and rural rents. And in a step typical of populist 
programmes, in 1980 the government introduced price controls over a range of 
basic consumption commodities, which kept the urban cost of living low. While 
these subsidies gained the government a degree of urban support, the programme 
had to be abandoned in the late 1980s when its budgetary cost became 
unsustainable. Associated with the programme of food subsidies to consumers 
were compulsory crop sales by farmers to the state grain procurement agency 
ENABAS (Empresa Nicaraguense de Alimentos Basicos), which created 
widespread discontent in the countryside.37 Macroeconomic policy also 
involved classic measures of populist governments: deficit spending, financed 
by foreign assistance in the early 1980s, and liberal credit expansion. 
The other part of the economic strategy, the state as the 'motor' of 
accumulation, never materialised. State enterprises overall ran a deficit, so 
instead of producing a fund for investment they drained the treasury. What 
investment occurred derived from external assistance or commercial bank 
borrowing. Since these investments had long periods of gestation or proved in 
practice unprofitable, the state lacked the means of asserting a leading role in the 
accumulation process. At the same time, the government sought to stimulate 
private investment within a 'mixed economy' based upon the 'logic of the 
majority': the private sector would be allowed to make profits, but within the 
constraint that profitability served the interests of the majority and the 
revolutionary process.38 In effect, the constraint on private sector behaviour was 
that it contribute to the war against the contra, following the principle of 
'expropriate the traitors', and reward the patriots, regardless of class. 
The decline in the economic power of the propertied classes resulted not from 
the growth of the state, but rather the other way around. While the Sandinistas 
avoided defining the revolution in terms of classes, the capitalists and landlords 
clearly saw it in these terms. Encouraged by the US government, they set about 
economic sabotage in varying degrees of overtness. Hundreds abandoned their 
estates and factories for Miami, to become active supporters of the contra. 
Others remained in Nicaragua, conducting their business to the minimal degree 
that would avoid confiscation. In consequence, the large scale private sector 
withered, not because of government action, but as part of a conscious effort to 
aid the counter-revolution. The rise in importance of the state did not represent 
a premeditated socialist programme so much as the necessary response to 
counter-revolutionary efforts of the propertied classes. The Sandinista 
government did implement a number of confiscations of property. With the 
exception of the seizures of the properties of Somocistas immediately following 
the triumph of the revolution, most confiscations involved making a virtue of 
necessity, for the lands and factories had been previously abandoned by their 
owners. The decline in the economic power of the propertied classes, while 
inherent in the revolutionary process, proceeded in a piecemeal and chaotic 
manner, resulting from events beyond the power of the government to effect. 
Similarly, the revolutionary transformation of social relations in the 
countryside resulted from forces beyond government control and often in a form 
contrary to the stated intentions of the Sandinista leadership. It was the 
revolution within the Revolution. The dominant, semi-official Sandinista analysis 
of the rural class structure considered Nicaragua a country of impoverished 
landless labourers who were rural proletarians or semi-proletarians. This 
reflected the view that the expansion of coffee production in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries initiated the capitalist transformation of Nicaragua, 
allegedly completed by the cotton boom of the 1950s and 1960s.39 Derivative 
from this analysis, the Sandinistas argued that the primary demand of the rural 
poor was not land but improved wages and working conditions. In keeping with 
this view, agrarian policy until 1985 stressed the creation of state farms and 
resisted the distribution of land into small holdings. 
Maintaining large state farms appealed to different groups within the Frente 
for other reasons. The Sandinista government opposed the dismantling of large 
estates in the belief that they were efficient production units. Dismembering 
them was viewed as economically irrational, for it would lower productivity and 
output. Policymakers resisted cooperativisation of these enterprises for much the 
same reason. Opposition to distributing land also reflected various class 
perspectives within and allied to the Frente. The propertied allies of the Frente 
opposed giving land to the peasantry, more at ease with maintaining wage 
relations for the class they traditionally repressed. State-owned agrarian 
enterprises appeared to them less threatening in terms of political control. They 
also argued that distribution of land would threaten agro-export production, 
because without landlessness fewer small producers would seek wage labour in 
the seasonal harvests. Officials in the Ministry of Agriculture (MIDINRA) were 
sympathetic with this view.40 Sandinista theoreticians, some drawing on a 
classical socialist critique, argued that the formation of a class of independent 
farmers would lead inevitably to social differentiation in the countryside and to 
the re-creation of a rural bourgeoisie and agrarian capitalism. In addition they 
maintained that rural small producers were inherently reactionary and, like the 
propertied classes (though from the opposite perspective), feared a large group 
of small farmers independent of the state. As the elections of 1990 were to 
prove, there appeared to be some truth to this last view. But whatever were the 
merits of these arguments, the analysis that most of the rural population had a 
working class perspective and did not demand land would be refuted by events. 
Although a third of the rural population was landless before 1979, in the 
sense that they did not enjoy ownership, it did not follow that they were 
alienated from the land and proletarianised.41 Nor did their class consciousness 
derive directly from the relations of production in which they participated during 
the harvest season. As we have argued, many 'landless' households obtained 
access to land through traditional forms of tenancy, often combined with 
labouring for wages in cotton, coffee, or sugar harvests. The primary access to 
land of these households was not mediated through wages. Whether or not most 
of the monetary income, or most of the working time, of these families derived 
from wages was not deterministic either to their class or their consciousness. 
More critical to their collective aspirations was that they did not identify as 
proletarians, alienated from the land. Their struggle was to expand their access 
to land, with the hope of one day owning a small farm.42 
Consistent with their interpretation of Nicaraguan history, the Sandinistas 
implemented a 'statist' agrarian policy from 1979 to 1984. Immediately after the 
triumph over Somoza, the government nationalised the ruling family's properties 
and those of its supporters, creating state farms. These properties constituted the 
heart of the Area de Propiedad del Pueblo, the state sector which included some 
of the best farm land in the country as well as industrial complexes for 
processing and exporting cotton, coffee, sugar, and beef. 
Protests for land erupted almost immediately after the government announced 
the formation of state farms. Peasant support for the Sandinistas prior to the 
defeat of Somoza, such as it was, rested on the promise of land. Change in the 
form of ownership, from private property associated with the Somocista regime 
to state owned enterprises, did not satisfy peasants' demands. In a concession 
to the protesters, in 1980 and 1981 the government made land available for short 
term rental to groups that agreed to work within production cooperatives. This 
period marked the genesis of mistrust between the peasantry and the 
Sandinistas.43 
In 1981 the government decreed an Agrarian Reform law that was vague and 
contradictory, reflecting the bitter conflicts that emerged in the process of 
developing agrarian policy.44 The law provided guarantees for private property 
so long as land was efficiently utilised, with no limit to size. Only land not 
worked productively was subject to expropriation, and then only if the entire 
enterprise was larger than specified sizes which varied by region. Perhaps the 
most radical provision of agrarian policy was that which abolished feudal or 
traditional tenure relations.45 What the decree meant for the future of land 
tenure and class relations could not be determined from the letter of the law but 
would depend on how it was interpreted and implemented. Although, since its 
creation in 1981, UNAG (Union Nacional de Agricultores y Ganaderos), the 
Sandinista organisation of small and medium farmers and ranchers, pressed for 
the distribution of land to individual families, through 1985 the government 
continued to favour state farms over any form of land distribution. Despite the 
disjuncture between their alleged inherent efficiency and the reality of 
widespread decapitalisation, the Sandinistas refrained from expropriating large 
private estates. Between 1981 and 1984 relatively little land was confiscated and 
the pace of redistribution remained slow. Peasant beneficiaries of the reform 
were organised, often against their will, into production cooperatives. If a 
cooperative was large and considered to be important it was administered 
directly by an official of MIDINRA.46 
Table 1 shows that between 1978 and the end of 1982 control over land by 
large private producers decreased significantly. For the most part this decrease 
was a result of the initial confiscation of the Somocistas' land in 1979. These 
properties, almost one quarter of the nation's agricultural land, became the state 
farms. Small producers' control over land declined slightly from 1978 to 1982, 
reflecting government policy of encouraging or imposing cooperative over 
individual forms of property. Small producers' access to land, credit, and 
technical assistance became contingent upon cooperativisation. 
TABLE 1 
Land Tenure in Nicaragua 
Percentage Distribution of Land: 1978, 1982 and 1988 
Notes: 
'There were an estimated 8 million manzanas of arable land distributed in the 
three years. 
2Manzana - the traditional measurement of land in Nicaragua, 1 manzana = 1.72 
acres = 7 hectares. 
3For 1982 and 1988 the figure includes the traditional 'peasant' sector that had 
access to land prior to 1979, beneficiaries of the Sandinista agrarian reform 
whose land was incorporated into cooperatives that legally were associations of 
individual producers, i.e. Cooperativos de Credito y Servicios (CCS), Colectivos 
de Trabajo (CT) and Cooperativos de Surco Muerto (CSM), peasants who 
received titles to land they claimed prior to 1979 ('Titulacion Especial'), and 
lands distributed to individual peasant households. 
4Cooperativas Agricolas Sandinistas (CAS). Although legally in these 
cooperatives land was farmed collectively, most cooperative land was not 
worked in common. 
5Most abandoned land was in the war zone. 
6Land titles to Comunidades lndigenas on the Atlantic Coast. 
Sources: 
Computed from data presented in La reforma agraria en Nicaragua 1979-1989: 
cifras y referencias documentales (Managua: CIERA, 1989), vol. IX, Tables 1-
23, pp. 39-61. See also Elizabeth Dore, 'The Great Grain Dilemma: Peasants 
and State Policy in Revolutionary Nicaragua', Peasant Studies, vol. 17, no. 2 
(Winter 1990), pp. 96-120. 
FORM OF TENURE1 1978 1982 1988 
Large producers 
(over 200 Mzs.)2 52 29 15 
Medium Producers 
(50-200 Mzs.) 30 30 17 
Small Producers 
(1-49 Mzs.)3 18 16 37 
Production Cooperatives4 - 2 11 
State Farms - 23 12 
Abandoned5 - - 6 
Communal6 2 
During 1979-84, the period referred to as 'Phase One' of the agrarian reform, 
government policy towards smallholders involved attempts to perfect the 
mechanisms whereby farmers were compelled to sell their products to 
ENABAS.47 
In the first phase of the agrarian reform the Sandinistas emphasised 
development of the forces of production, or 'modernisation', over transformation 
of social relations. Conditions under which rural workers were united with the 
means of production were not fundamentally altered. Because of this, Sandinista 
agrarian and commercial policy reproduced a formal similarity to what the 
Sandinistas' called 'the somocista economic model', characterised as state 
promotion of the agro-export sector with food production for internal 
consumption assigned low priority. In the early years of the revolution the 
Sandinista government launched with great fanfare the development of large 
agro-export projects which accounted for the bulk of state spending on 
agriculture (much of it financed by foreign borrowing). By the late 1980s almost 
all of these enterprises had fallen far short of their promise, except for the 
investment funds they absorbed.48 
Sandinista agrarian policy changed dramatically in 1985. The change 
developed less out of a process of theoretical or analytical revision than from 
necessity. An agricultural sector based on large estates became impossible to 
sustain. The war against the contra so severely strained the national budget that 
the government could no longer afford to subsidise the state farms. More 
important, however, were the political repercussions of the state farm policy. By 
1984 it became apparent that many peasants in the war zones supported the 
contra. In an effort to win the political allegiance of the rural population, the 
Sandinistas yielded to pressure from UNAG to distribute land. Acreage on state 
farms and on abandoned or decapitalised private estates passed to cooperatives 
and, for the first time since the triumph of the revolution, to individual 
households. Between 1982 and 1988 the proportion of the nation's agricultural 
and grazing land held by state farms declined from 23 to 12 per cent. Land on 
large private estates declined from 29 to 15 per cent, while the proportion of 
land on medium sized farms dropped from 30 to 17 per cent (Table 1). In 
addition to redistributing land, from 1985 through 1989 MIDINRA embarked on 
an extensive programme in which peasants received title to land they cultivated. 
By 1988, 18 per cent of the country's farm land had been titled under this 
programme (Table 2). 
The effect of this policy reversal was to alter fundamentally the class structure 
in a manner contrary to the original intentions of the FSLN leadership. In 
response to the growing contradictions caused by a policy of fostering large 
scale agriculture, the Sandinistas presided over the creation of a large class of 
small rural proprietors. In 1978, smallholders accounted for eighteen per cent 
TABLE 2 
Effect of Sandinista Agrarian Reform on Small Producers 
'Peasant'/Small Producer Households No. % 
I Small producer households1 160,000 100 
(as percentage of small producer households) 
A Households in need of land in 19782 120,000 75 
B Households receiving land under SAR3 65,000 41 
C Households acquiring title to land they 
occupied/cultivated prior to SAR 34,000 21 
D Households gaining land (B+C) 99,000 62 
Arable Land (manzanas)4 
II Land in use for grazing and agriculture5 8,000,000 100 
(as percentage of arable land) 
A Acquired by small producer households 
through SAR (1979-1988) 1,100,000 14 
B Titled to small producer households that 
previously occupied/cultivated same land 
(1979-1988) 1,479,000 18 
C 'Land to the tiller' through SAR (A+B) 2,579,000 32 
Notes: 
These data represent distribution and titling of land through 1988. The 
Sandinistas distributed and titled additional land during the election campaign 
prior to the elections of February 1990; and prior to the inauguration of the 
Chamorro government in April 1990. 
1 Official estimate by MIDINRA (Ministry of Agrarian Reform in the Sandinista 
Government) of number of 'peasant hoseholds'. Estimate does not vary from 
1978 to 1988. 
2 'in need of' - obviously a subjective judgement - reflects policies and 
pronouncements of MIDINRA. 
3 SAR = Sandinista Agrarian Reform. Direct access to land in all cooperative 
forms and lands distributed to individual households. 
4 Manzana - the traditional measurement of land in Nicaragua. 1 manzana = 
1.72 acres = 0.7 hectares. 
5 Official estimate by MIDINRA. 
Sources: Computed from data presented in La reforma agraria en Nicaragua, 
1979-1989: cifras y referencias documentales (Managua: CIERA, 1989), vol. IX, 
Tables 2-23, pp. 40-61; and Ivan Gutierrez, 'La politica de tierras de la reforma 
agraria en Nicaragua', in Raul Ruben and Jan P. de Groot, eds., El debate sobre 
la reforma agraria en Nicaragua (Managua: INIES, 1989), pp. 113-128. 
of the nation's arable land; by the end of the 1980s small farmers cultivated 
almost half of the land. Official figures show the small farmer sector controlling 
37 per cent of the arable land in 1988, but the true proportion was higher. Most 
of the land assigned to production cooperatives in practice was worked as 
household property. Thus one should add to the small farmer category much of 
the 11 per cent of land held by cooperatives (Table 1). Further, under the 
Sandinista agrarian reform most rural families gained access to land. Between 
1979 and 1988 sixty-two per cent of small producers either acquired new land 
or titles to land they already worked. And 32 per cent of all arable land had 
been given to the tillers of the soil (Table 2). 
In summary, by the end of the 1980s Nicaragua was a country radically 
transformed from what it had been a decade before. The control of land by the 
old dominant classes had drastically declined. By abandoning their property and 
manoeuvering to subvert the government they forfeited the measure of economic 
power the Sandinistas had been willing to grant them. At the same time, a new 
political force emerged: small farmers, freed from the servile and patronal 
relations of production that had held them in subservience before the revolution. 
These changes created the potential for a major political transformation, which 
would find expression after the electoral defeat of the Sandinistas in February 
1990. 
The Ideology of the Sandinistas 
Central to misunderstanding the Sandinista movement and the government it 
presided over was the labelling of the FSLN as 'Marxist' or, even more 
obfuscating, 'Marxist-Leninist'. By the early 1980s this characterisation of the 
Sandinistas achieved the respectability of conventional wisdom. It represented 
the keystone of the Reagan administration's Central America policy, finding its 
way into a World Bank publication,49 even gaining respectability through 
'verification' by academic research.50 Prior to considering whether the FSLN 
was in practice Marxist or Leninist (or some other variation of revolutionary 
socialism), it is necessary to clarify, from the point of view of US ruling circles, 
the implication of being so labelled. 
Whatever Marxism and Leninism means to socialists, in the anti-communist 
culture of US policymakers it has a clear and quasi-religious connotation, 
standing in relation to bourgeois democratic values as the antichrist does to 
Christianity. In this metaphysical usage of the term, already anachronistic in the 
1990s, Marxism-Leninism represented a totalitarian philosophy, with its 
practitioners purposefully imposing an ideology and political system destructive 
of freedom and inherently aggressive, intent on subjugating the world. Within 
the confines of this anti-communist myth-system, the possibility of a Marxist 
government in any way serving the interests of the populace was ruled out by 
definition. This anti-rational world view provided an all-encompassing 
interpretation of regimes, enabling their actions to be revealed as uniformly 
nefarious, even before they occurred.51 
The Reagan and Bush administrations applied this metaphysics of political 
analysis to Nicaragua with a vengeance, such that any rational consideration of 
the nature of the Sandinista regime proved impossible. Analysis of the FSLN 
was made no easier by the supporters of the Sandinistas accepting this labelling. 
For supporters, identifying Nicaragua as Marxist, Marxist-Leninist, socialist, etc, 
lent to the regime a mystique that served to cancel or at least defer criticism of 
Sandinista political practice. Both anti-communist enemies and pro-socialist 
friends of the regime could apply the same metaphysics to interpret events 
within a preconceived paradigm of Sandinista actions, past, present, and future. 
Soon after the revolution it became clear that the leadership of the FSLN had 
an obsessive aversion to criticism of any type, by supporters or opponents at 
home or abroad. To opponents of the regime, this aversion provided evidence 
of the communist totalitarian tendencies within the FSLN; for the regime's 
supporters, it demonstrated that the Sandinistas fostered a new and more 
profound form of popular democracy in which the bourgeois forms of freedom 
and participation did not apply. Both enemies and supporters rejected the 
obvious explanation for Sandinista intolerance of dissent: that the FSLN was a 
hierarchical military movement, preoccupied in institutionalising its rule in a 
country with no tradition of democracy. Such an explanation would for both 
sides have trivialised the Nicaraguan revolution, robbing it of both its demonic 
totalitarianism and its romantic millenarianism. 
A reasonably detached and analytical treatment of the Sandinistas reveals that 
the movement that overthrew Somoza was led by a polyglot group of men and 
women with little clear plan for what would occur once the dictatorship had 
been defeated. In so far as there was a unifying ideology it involved the fervent 
conviction that the New Nicaragua would be free from the domination of the 
United States, and the economy of the country would be reorganised to provide 
more benefit to the lower classes. The vaguely-articulated commitment to 
populist economic reform came to be epitomised in an oft-repeated Sandinista 
slogan, 'the logic of the majority'. The analysis went as follows. Under Somoza, 
society and economic life assumed its form in response to the repressive power 
of the capitalists ('the logic of the minority'). After July 1979, social and 
economic power passed to the people, led by the National Directorate of the 
FSLN. Then society increasingly conformed to the 'logic of the majority', which 
was synonymous with socialism.52 Six months after the electoral defeat of the 
Sandinistas few if any defended this essentially populist characterisation of the 
Nicaraguan revolution; certainly not the leadership of the FSLN.53 But for 
eleven years it epitomised Sandinista political analysis. Its vagueness was not 
accidental, nor did it reflect a cynical attempt to provide the rhetoric of change 
without the action. Rather, ambiguity in this case derived from the nature of the 
struggle to overthrow the dictatorship. 
This polemical dichotomy between the 'majority' and the 'minority' reflected, 
on the one hand, the exceptional nature of the Sandinista regime and, on the 
other, an ahistorical and eclectic interpretation of social conflict. The Sandinista 
regime was 'exceptional' in that it came to power on the crest of an anti-
dictatorial insurrection and had no solid class base. The ideological dichotomy, 
'majority-minority', was ahistorical, in that it contained no class analysis. The 
vague term 'majority' obscured the social divisions characteristic of a particular 
historical moment and social formation. The FSLN applied a quantitative 
concept (majority) to a process in which relations of production, qualitative 
differences, represented the basis of conflict. The eclecticism of the concept, the 
'majority', derived from its failure to draw the distinction between exploitation 
and repression, which is central to understanding moments of social change. 
While all political analysis involves abstractions, Sandinista political ideology 
based itself upon an invalid abstraction: that the New Nicaragua could be 
constructed on the basis of numbers. 
Particularly invalid was the abstraction from the division of society between 
exploiters and exploited.54 Exploited classes necessarily suffer repression to 
some degree as part of the appropriation of their surplus labour by an exploiting 
class. In Nicaragua non-exploited groups, the urban petty bourgeoisie, middle-
sized farmers, even portions of the capitalist class, suffered repression by the 
Somoza regime. Because of this repression, commonly taking the form of denial 
of basic bourgeois freedoms, they supported and joined the anti-dictatorial 
alliance. 
This common cause that found expression in the insurrectionary struggle itself 
did not continue in the post-insurrectionary period. Each group that had suffered 
under the rule of Anastasio Somoza Garcia sought changes after the overthrow 
of the dictator consistent with its particular relations of production. Workers 
wanted better wages and working conditions. The rural poor demanded land. The 
urban petty bourgeoisie hoped for the opportunity to maintain and extend its 
privileges. And capitalists and landlords wanted more favourable access to 
markets, finance, and, above all, state power. These various demands proved 
contradictory, even in antagonistic conflict, within the post-triumph coalition. In 
effect, the Somoza dictatorship obscured class conflicts within Nicaraguan 
society by the democratic character of the regime's social and economic 
repression, which it visited upon the majority. 
We are not arguing that Sandinista populism had no real basis. On the 
contrary, during the insurrection there was an objective foundation for the 
FSLN's characterisation of the conflict as one between the minority and the 
majority. The nature of the last Somoza regime created this dichotomy because 
of its shrinking support and general denial of bourgeois freedoms. The 
dictatorship forged a vast majority dedicated to a common cause: the end of 
tyranny. Once the insurrection triumphed, this division, born of a narrowly-based 
dictatorship, lost its historical relevance; indeed, it no longer existed. After July 
1979 the minority/majority dichotomy became a fiction, polemically maintained 
to provide the ideological justification and legitimacy of an essentially populist 
programme. 
Marx coined the term 'exceptional regime' to refer to the Third Empire of 
Louis Napoleon, which, he argued, represented not the dominant classes in 
France, but rather the rural and urban petty bourgeoisie.55 The Sandinista years 
were even more exceptional, for the power of the National Directorate derived 
from no coherent class base. Because of their loose and ambiguous mass 
support, exceptional regimes tend not to make history, but rather to be swept 
along by the historic wave of social forces that bring them to power. So it was 
with the FSLN: in insurrection it altered the course of Nicaraguan history or, at 
least, served as a catalyst for changes long overdue; in power it reacted when 
confronted by, rather than itself initiating, change. The Sandinista regime lacked 
a coherent political programme, not because of insufficient imagination or 
ideological commitment, but because it lacked a coherent political base. As such, 
the reactive and vacillating nature of the regime was not a failure, but a 
reflection of material conditions in Nicaragua. The organisation and class 
consciousness of the working class and the peasantry remained weak, the former 
because of incipient capitalist development, the latter by virtue of social relations 
in the countryside. 
The absence of a political base resulted in political incoherence and 
vacillating leadership. Visions of post-triumph Nicaragua abounded within the 
National Directorship: a social democratic 'mixed economy' in which private 
capital would play a secondary role to an activist state; a Proudhonist socialism 
of small farmers, the urban petty bourgeoisie and worker-controlled factories; 
and an idealised Cuban model in which the dominant classes were dispossessed 
through state ownership. Had any one of these found support from an organised 
and politically coherent group (the role played by the Communist Party of Cuba 
in that country's revolution), it might have been imposed as the post-insurrection 
outcome, pushing aside the other visions of the New Nicaragua. Debate over the 
future of the revolution rarely reached the public. The Frente Sandinista was 
essentially a military organisation, and ruled accordingly in a hierarchical and 
anti-participatory manner. As with many other populist military regimes, 
nationalism served as its legitimating ideology. To label it Marxist or socialist 
distorted the nature of the movement beyond recognition. 
In the 1970s the term 'national liberation struggle' came to be used loosely 
on the left to refer to almost any nationalist insurrectionary movement in 
underdeveloped countries. This loose usage was not completely wrong, because 
there is a sense in which all underdeveloped countries suffer from external 
domination because of their economic and political weakness. However, 
insurrectionary movements in many if not most of these countries would more 
precisely be identified as 'anti-dictatorial' or 'national democratic', for they 
sought liberation from an internal oppressor, not an external one. In El Salvador, 
for example, the struggle launched in the late 1970s began as a conflict to 
overthrow a landed oligarchy, with the major role of the United States coming 
only after the left appeared close to success. In contrast, the insurrection led by 
the Sandinistas represented a struggle for national liberation in an almost pure 
form. The close identification of the Somoza family with US political interests 
meant that the anti-dictatorial struggle could not be separated from a struggle to 
free the country from external domination. 
The repeated failures of the propertied classes' opposition to the Somozas 
resulted from trying to separate despotism from external domination. Because 
of the National Guard's elitist organisation and loyalty to a family rather than 
to the dominant classes as a whole, this army ruled over Nicaragua much like 
an occupying force. The first Somoza expanded his power through political skill 
and ruthlessness, perhaps beyond the intent of his patrons in Washington. And 
while he established a certain autonomy from his erstwhile masters, the 
association of the Somoza dynasty with US interests remained close and 
paramount in the consciousness of Nicaraguans. 
The emphasis on national identity and independence was a natural one for the 
peasants, workers, and petty-bourgeoisie of Nicaragua; and it defined the radical 
and populist character of the FSLN. The Frente's stress on national aspirations 
also fitted well with the class structure of the country, for Nicaragua possessed 
neither a substantial working class on which to base a socialist ideology, nor a 
coherent peasant movement, which in El Salvador gave the struggle of the 
FMLN (Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front) its radical class character. 
However, the Sandinistas' emphasis on nationalism generated contradictory 
results for the population's participation in the revolutionary process. During the 
struggle to overthrow the dictatorship, nationalism served as a politicising 
ideology, the glue that held together a broad and disparate coalition. It provided, 
in effect, the abstract goals to justify the great sacrifices demanded of the 
population during a savage and bloody conflict that claimed tens of thousands 
of lives.56 Once the dictator fled, and an armed movement took power that was 
uncompromisingly dedicated to the independence of Nicaragua from US 
domination, the nationalist goals had been achieved. At that moment of triumph, 
July 1979, the FSLN found itself in a situation somewhat analogous to that of 
Sandino in 1932. The externally-supported agents of Nicaragua's oppression had 
withdrawn in defeat: the US Marines in 1933, and their proteges, the National 
Guard, 45 years later. Sandino ceased his struggle with withdrawal of the 
Marines, but within a year his assassination and the continuation of US 
domination in different form undid the work of his peasant army. From this 
experience the FSLN took the lesson that the elimination of US domination 
required not only the overthrow of the Somoza dynasty, but also a subsequent 
period in which the nationalist movement could consolidate its victory. 
The anti-imperialist and anti-dictatorial ideology which guided the armed 
struggle to victory over Somoza proved insufficient to the task of consolidating 
that victory. Once the Somoza regime fell, conflicting class-based demands 
assumed primacy over the nationalist enthusiasm that had held together the anti-
dictatorial coalition. Workers sought better wages and improved conditions, 
while the capitalists demanded a return to labour discipline so that they might 
re-establish profitability. In the countryside, landless and land-poor families 
demanded land, while the large and medium-sized producers pressed for 
guarantees of private property and protection from land invasions. Rather than 
seek to resolve these hostile claims, the FSLN, which dominated the new 
government, pursued a vacillating policy in which it sought to maintain the anti-
dictatorial coalition intact. To achieve this, it continued the rhetoric of 
nationalism, seeking to diffuse the growing social tensions with the euphemistic 
language of 'majority' and 'minority', and, increasingly, the parallel dichotomy, 
'patriots' and 'traitors'. 
There was a strict sense in which this latter dichotomy applied to the post-
triumph period. At the outset of the counter-revolution, with the Reagan 
administration funding the contra, those that opposed the new government 
included supporters of the ancien regime and/or those in the direct pay of an 
external power. But as the new conflict intensified and stretched through the 
1980s, the patriot/traitor dichotomy wore increasingly thin, rhetorically devalued 
through excessive use. The argument of the FSLN that the anti-contra war 
represented the continuation of the anti-Somoza struggle was in large part true. 
Nevertheless, this all-purpose characterisation of the conflict became less 
compelling as economic decline set in. The protracted nature of US-funded 
aggression placed the burden upon the Sandinista leadership to demonstrate that 
it could move beyond a nationalist victory and provide a coherent vision and a 
solid economic base for the New Nicaragua. This challenge the National 
Directorate was unable to meet, for it attempted to manage the contra conflict 
with the ideology of the anti-Somoza war. Nicaraguans fought to victory under 
that banner once; but after the fall of Somoza and the rout of the contra, the 
working class and the peasantry sought new goals, democratic participation and 
economic improvement. 
While it previously served to inspire people to action, after 1979 nationalist 
ideology functioned as a substitute for political debate. Indeed, it was 
implemented to suppress that debate. Perhaps because of the divisions within its 
own ranks, the National Directorate chose to depoliticise the population through 
the substitution of nationalism for the class conflict that was inherent in the 
process of political modernisation. The Somoza dictatorship long delayed this 
modernistion, such that pent-up pressure for social change and political 
participation burst forth under Sandinista rule. The unifying nationalist ideology 
became a justification for a chaotic status quo in which all groups, except the 
Sandinista bureaucracy, seemed to lose. An irony of the Sandinista movement 
was that it liberated the Nicaraguan people, but in power proved an obstacle to 
the class struggles that might fulfill the aspirations of the workers and peasants 
of Nicaragua. Of course, the unrelenting opposition of the US government to the 
Sandinistas would, most likely, have sabotaged whatever political programme 
they attempted to implement. 
Rightwing, anti-communist critics of the Sandinistas interpreted the 
ideologically repressive role of nationalist rhetoric as evidence of the 
Sandinistas' Marxist-Leninist nature asserting itself. Friends of the regime 
defended the rhetoric for the same reason. The former railed against the 
totalitarianism they had predicted and hoped for; the latter saw nationalist 
language as the essence of socialist revolution in Nicaragua. Both critics and 
friends held in common the belief that 4anti-Americanism' implied a 
commitment to socialist revolution. Sandinista practice was quite different: 
nationalist ideology functioned to banish class considerations from politics. After 
the defeat of Somoza all important issues of public policy, especially those of 
the economic programme, became issues of intense class conflict. But the 
National Directorate's continued emphasis on nationalism structured public 
debate, in as far as it occurred, along increasingly banal and trivial lines, such 
that civic life became progressively depoliticised. 
To maintain the political mobilisation necessary for the war against the contra 
while neutralising political life, the Sandinista leadership manifested more and 
more the anti-democratic tendencies so eagerly anticipated by its reactionary 
critics. The most blatant form taken by this tendency came with the slogan of 
the early 1980s, 'The National Directorate orders!' ('La Direction National 
Ordena'), to which the implicit response was obvious. However, if 
authoritarianism represented the form of national politics, ideological anarchy 
was the essence. Far from imposing its political authority on the country, the 
National Directorate could not even do so on itself. The appearance of politics 
was unity, with overt criticism banned down to the lowest level of the Sandinista 
movement and the civil service, with the two largely overlapping. In practice, 
however, ministries pursued flagrantly contradictory policies, and policies within 
ministries cancelled each other out. Very much consistent with the implicit 
eclecticism of nationalism and populism the discipline the National Directorate 
imposed on militants of its movement was less ideological than organisational. 
But that was obfuscated by the chaos and lack of leadership that the Directorate 
never admitted. 
The essentially apolitical character of the Sandinista movement resulted in the 
depoliticising of civic life. To characterise as apolitical a movement that 
achieved an epoch-making victory in Latin America - the defeat of the Somoza 
dynasty and thereby of US imperialism itself - may seem bizarre. But once this 
hypothesis is entertained, events of the 1980s in Nicaragua come into focus. 
While nationalism is a political doctrine, by itself it offers no programme for 
social or economic organisation of a country; or, alternatively, it is consistent 
with all political programmes to a degree. If pursued single-mindedly as the 
unifying ideology, as it was in Nicaragua under the Sandinistas, it precludes 
discussion of other political themes that would draw out the antagonisms within 
the 'majority', differences which would result in undermining nationalism as a 
unifying force. 
The Sandinista movement evoked nationalism with single-minded obsession 
because it lacked the class base which would have given it a more complex yet 
focused ideological outlook. In the absence of the political base to resolve the 
ideological competition over the outcome of the revolution, the leadership of the 
FSLN pursued a chaotic collection of conflicting goals, in which policy was 
debated but rarely resolved. In consequence, the National Directorate never 
effectively controlled the course of events. It was swept along in a revolutionary 
process increasingly defined by and responding to external counter-revolutionary 
aggression. To assert control over the revolutionary process, the Sandinista Party 
needed to give leadership and direction to the struggle of workers and peasants 
against the propertied classes; or failing that, to allow these groups to forge 
autonomous and effective organisations. But effective mass organisations might 
have resulted in irreversible antagonisms within the National Directorate, 
precisely because struggles based on a strong political movement would have 
tended to resolve the competition over post-triumph goals. The resulting split 
within the Sandinista movement might, in turn, have facilitated the victory of 
armed counter-revolution. 
The lack of direction that characterised the National Directorate prompted 
some left critics to cast doubt upon whether a revolution was in process at all. 
In milder form others divided the Sandinista years between an early period in 
which revolutionary policies were pursued, and the later years when revolution 
had been abandoned. The first position, that the revolution was a sham, takes too 
narrow and dogmatic a view of radical change, ignoring the potentially 
revolutionary nature and momentum of popular movements. That the National 
Directorate did not and could not control events is testimony to the revolution 
that transformed Nicaragua in the 1980s. The second, while correct in stressing 
that the revolution passed through different phases, errs by presuming that the 
Sandinistas held effective control over the course of change. 
The Fall of the Sandinistas 
The Sandinistas lost the election of February 1990 for many reasons. First, the 
rural petty bourgeoisie, which owed its existence to the Sandinistas, had 
contradictory class interests. Because of their economic position, many small 
farmers felt more affinity for the UNO (Union Nacional Opositora) than for the 
FSLN. Second, the political programme that guided the FSLN to revolutionary 
triumph in 1979 and electoral victory in 1984, uncompromising nationalism, 
could not serve as a strategy for governing the country. And third, that 
nationalist programme incurred the wrath of the US government. 
By fulfilling the demand of the peasantry for land, the FSLN contributed to 
its election defeat. The small farmers that the Sandinistas created after 1985 
vacillated in their political allegiance. On the one hand, small farmers owed their 
existence to the Sandinista government and feared that a return to the rule of the 
traditional elite might threaten its control over land. On the other hand, the petty 
bourgeois rhetoric and symbolism of the UNO tended to appeal to the class 
interests of small rural proprietors. To complicate the electoral preference of the 
newly formed rural petty bourgeoisie, the UNO programme was laden with 
ambiguities. The UNO pledged to respect land distribution carried out by the 
Sandinistas and also to return to owners property which had been confiscated, 
two campaign promises obviously impossible to fulfill simultaneously. During 
the campaign the UNO stressed the former, for reasons of expediency, overtly 
courting the beneficiaries of the Sandinista agrarian reform, rather than the 
traditional propertied classes, which would support the UNO in any case. 
As indicated, relations between the Sandinista government and small rural 
producers had soured well before the election. Although UNAG was a creation 
of the Sandinistas, it exhibited more autonomy from the state than did other 
mass organisations. From the early 1980s UNAG made clear its opposition to 
many aspects of agrarian policy including promotion of state farms, preference 
for cooperativisation over individual small proprietorship, official pricing policy 
and the politics of state grain procurement. UNAG called on the government to 
confiscate more land, to distribute it to individual households and to de-regulate 
the market in basic grains. But before 1985 the government paid little heed to 
these demands. As a consequence, even many beneficiaries of the reforms, 
workers on state farms and members of cooperatives, believed that a new 
oppressor, the Sandinista state, had replaced the old. Many of the rural poor felt 
betrayed by the revolution and readjusted their vision of the past. Thus, by the 
time the Sandinistas had reversed their agrarian policy, financial constraints 
prevented the government from further appeasing the rural petty-bourgeoisie. 
After 1985, when large numbers of small producers received land, the contra 
war was at its height and the government was unable to provide these new 
landowners with the credit and technical assistance they needed to cultive their 
small farms. The political damage was beyond repair in the short term. 
In the presidential elections of February 1990, the FSLN received thirty-six 
per cent of the rural population vote, below its national average of 41 per 
cent.57 This outcome poses the question of why just over one-third of the rural 
population voted for the FSLN when almost two-thirds of all small farmer 
households benefited from the agrarian reform. Further, electoral analysis 
showed that in some regions more than half the members of many Sandinista 
production cooperatives (CAS), supposedly the FSLN vanguard in the 
countryside, voted for the UNO. These results were less surprising in light of 
our analysis, for one might ask why as many as 36 per cent of the rural 
population, many of whom represented an emergent petty-bourgeoisie, voted for 
a party with a revolutionary image. The role of smallholders in the vote reflected 
the contradictory class stand of the petty-bourgeoisie and the particular history 
of the Sandinista revolution. On the one hand, the Sandinista government gave 
land; on the other hand, that government pursued interventionist policies that 
seemed to restrict the ability of smallholders to take economic advantage of land 
they received. 
Though it may seem ironic, it was possible that the contra policy of the US 
government allowed the FSLN to extend its rule over Nicaragua beyond its time. 
Though the US-funded war contributed to the defeat of the Sandinistas, it also 
maintained the relevance of a purely nationalist ideology. But by the end of 
1989, the war against the contra had been won for practical purposes, and the 
lingering of the conflict took on a different significance. Daniel Ortega in his 
second presidential campaign could promise with justification that the conflict 
no longer represented a threat to his government. 
If some contra leaders and their US tutors for a while believed that they 
would some day march triumphantly into Managua, even the most optimistic 
must have abandoned that dream by the late 1980s. The Sandinista army 
(Ejercito Popular Sandinista) defeated all attempts by the contra to establish a 
permanent base in the country, beyond guerrilla activities concentrated in 
pockets of localised support. The contra leadership implicitly conceded this by 
entering into negotiations with the Sandinista government in 1989, during which 
the question of sharing power in some form of transitional government was 
never seriously considered. The Nicaraguan government had defeated the forces 
of counter-revolution, but could not destroy them as long as they enjoyed US 
support and sanctuary in Honduras. This decisive but non-definitive defeat of the 
counter-revolution left the government in the difficult position of continuing to 
wage an expensive war in economic and human terms, but unable credibly to 
claim that the war threatened national survival or the fate of the revolution. It 
appeared that the war could continue indefinitely, that there would be no clear 
demarcation between wartime, calling for great sacrifices, and peacetime, when 
society would return to normal policies pursued to promote economic prosperity. 
By 1989, for many Nicaraguans the central political issue had shifted from 
winning the just nationalist war to repairing the devastation wreaked by a decade 
of warfare and rebuilding the economy. 
Since its founding in 1961 the leadership of the FSLN played one political 
note, nationalism. With the war near its end, the rationale for the existence of 
a Sandinista government, as defined by that government itself, also neared its 
term. In the presidential campaign, the Sandinista leadership added to the 
prospect of peace a promise of economic improvement: 'everything will be 
better' ('todo sera mejor'). This represented a potentially counter-productive 
slogan for a government that over eleven years had produced no coherent 
economic strategy; indeed, had lost control of the monetary economy. It has 
been argued that people rejected nationalism when they voted against the 
Sandinistas, or, that they weighed national self-determination against the 
gathering misery inflicted by the US government and were moved by the latter 
rather than the former.58 This interpretation fails to appreciate that the 
nationalist programme had lost much of its relevance by February 1990. 
Well before the election the central political issue became not the war against 
the contra, but how the economy would be stabilised and revived. As the war 
dragged on, the economic decline and material suffering of the population 
loomed larger than the threat posed by the counter-revolutionary forces. The 
leadership of the FSLN, through its successful strategic defeat of US 
imperialism, convinced the vast majority of the Nicaraguan population that the 
revolution would endure. This, in turn, created an expectation among all classes 
that the decline of the economy would be reversed. Contrary to this expectation, 
progressive success in eliminating the contra threat coincided with virtual 
collapse of the money economy. From 1982 through 1987, national income 
declined, but at a relatively low annual average rate of -0.5 per cent, and per 
capita income declined at -3.1 per cent.59 This six year decline paled to 
insignificance in comparison to 1988, when per capita income dropped by 
almost twelve per cent, which itself was eclipsed by a contraction of close to 
fifteen per cent in 1989. Along with these near-catastrophic declines, inflation 
in 1988 set a modern Latin American record for a twelve-month period at 
11,500 per cent, a record that was shattered the following year by a rate of 
35,000 per cent. 
By the end of the 1980s, through the success of their new agrarian policy and 
execution of the war the Sandinistas had created the circumstances for their 
electoral defeat. The creation of a large class of small farmers generated in the 
countryside a group whose economic outlook conflicted with the populist politics 
of the government. Simultaneously, the strategic defeat of the contra brought the 
issue of economic strategy and management to the foreground. The Sandinistas 
did not anticipate the coming electoral defeat because they, like their supporters 
{and opponents) within and outside the country, remained captive to an image 
of Nicaragua no longer relevant: a country of the revolutionary majority, in 
which the ideology of anti-imperialism retained its primacy over class interests. 
After the Fall 
The electoral defeat of the Sandinistas marked for some the end of the 
Nicaraguan revolution.60 While valid in a sense, this interpretation treats 
revolution as derivative from the actions of leaders and governments rather than 
from the often chaotic unfolding of social conflict; and it further presumes that 
the National Directorate continued as a purposeful agent of revolutionary change 
to the end of its tenure in office. It would be more correct to say that the 
assumption of the presidency by Violeta Chamorro in April 1990 ended 
Sandinista reign over a revolutionary process which the defeat of Somoza in 
1979 had set in motion. 
Political power in the first year after the defeat of the Sandinistas took the 
form of an alliance between part of the victorious UNO coalition and the 
leadership of the FSLN. In essence the country suffered from a vacuum of 
power, in which no political party or group could muster the means to provide 
stability, much less coherent leadership, in a deteriorating social and economic 
situation. As during the decade of Sandinista government, form tended to rule 
over essence. Masters of the form of mass participation, while facilitating little 
in practice, the FSLN leadership continued its top-down political organisation.61 
Before the election, the National Directorate identified the UNO coalition as 
consisting of two factions, a 'moderate' group with which agreement could be 
reached on important national goals, and a 'right wing' or 'extremist' faction 
that presented a threat to the achievements of the revolution. The first group 
consisted of those closely connected to Violeta Chamorro, and the second to the 
supporters of Virgilio Godoy. This analytical division would prove to be the 
keystone of the FSLN's post-election political strategy. After the UNO coalition 
took nominal control of government institutions, the FSLN leadership adopted 
the catch-phrase 'governing from below',62 a role to be achieved through 
increasingly close cooperation with the Chamorro group. If thought was given 
to forming a leftist coalition in opposition to both factions in the UNO, no 
FSLN leader ever publicly discussed the possibility.63 
According to early post-election statements by the FSLN comandantes, 
cooperation with the Chamorro group did not involve an alliance, but rather 
defence of 'institutionally'64 and 'stability'.65 The former represented a 
euphemism for the agreement that the army and police would remain under 
Sandinista command; while the latter, used interchangeably with 'social peace', 
had vaguer and broader meaning, implying a normalisation of social conflict 
within the confines of electoral politics. Key to the justification of 'stability' as 
a central element of FSLN post-defeat strategy was the argument put forward 
by Comandante Luis Carrion that the Frente considered its 'historic programme 
basically fulfilled',66 implying that in opposition, consolidation and protection 
of gains represented the key tasks. 
The tactical relationship between the leadership of the FSLN and the 
Chamorro group, sometimes as formal and stylised as a Strauss waltz, proved 
fascinating, particularly in its apparent support for the view that in Nicaraguan 
politics kinship ruled over ideology. Important for analytical purposes was the 
relationship between this alliance and the underlying revolutionary process which 
the Sandinistas set in motion by the defeat of the Somoza dynasty. One scenario 
of post-election politics was that in concert the Sandinista leadership and the 
Chamorro group would bring about a consolidation of bourgeois democracy, 
forge a stable state, and modernise Nicaragua.67 
Such an objective might be seen as a continuation of the short-lived coalition 
government of 1979-80, and a re-emergence of the obfuscated but on-going 
FSLN alliance with sectors of the traditional elite. Following their triumph, the 
FSLN formed a coalition government with some of the same representatives of 
the propertied classes who would a decade later constitute the 'moderate' faction 
of the UNO.68 This alliance had been crucial to the 'mixed economy' and 
'political pluralism' strategies of the early Sandinista years; although after the 
1979-80 coalition government fell apart the strategies continued. In terms of the 
development of the revolution, the first government after the triumph represented 
a national democratic alliance that might have forged a programme of 
modernisation out of the chaos of insurrection. 
However, that first attempt at a modernising national coalition foundered on 
the weakness of the propertied classes and the momentary strength of the FSLN. 
With no army whose loyalty they could command and divided among 
themselves, the propertied classes brought little bargaining power to the coalition 
and no common project. Saddled with a weak and vacillating coalition partner, 
the many currents within the FSLN took their own courses, leaving the 
representatives of the propertied classes to complain of Marxist duplicity. 
Even before the election of February 1990, the 1979 coalition was reborn, 
with many of the same actors. After the UNO victory at the polls something 
closer to equality characterised the coalition of military populists and bourgeois 
modernisers. The Sandinistas controlled the army and much of the state 
apparatus, including many of the public enterprises. The Chamorro group 
claimed the executive, from which it could not be dislodged without incurring 
renewed military intervention by the United States. Further, it appeared that the 
economic programme the new government wished to implement represented no 
fundamental break with the policies of the latter days of the Ortega presidency. 
The main differences between the FSLN leadership and the Chamorro 
government involved the pace of implementation of the stabilisation package, 
particularly with respect to reductions in the civil service and the army, and the 
time-table for privatisation of factories and land. At first, cutting back the civil 
service and the army proved especially contentious since these two institutions 
represented a large share of the organised base of the FSLN. Two major and 
violent strikes, in May and July 1990, forced the Chamorro group to postpone 
implementation of public sector layoffs and privatisations. While differences 
over the civil service and the army were of importance, they were also 
negotiable. In 1988 and 1989 Daniel Ortega himself decreed an economic 
adjustment plan which involved major layoffs of state workers and plummeting 
real wages. The Sandinistas implemented this package in the hope of ingratiating 
themselves with the international banking community and returning Nicaragua 
to the fold of the old economic order. 
Thus, a scenario of capitalist modernisation mediated by populist restraint 
seemed to unfold through 1990. The coalition of 1979 was born again to rule. 
Initially Chamorro's side moved carefully, afraid to take steps that might 
provoke Sandinista leaders. By 1991 the context had clearly changed. The 
alliance was secure, with the Chamorristas the dominant partner, and the populist 
fa$ade was crumbling as the Sandinista leaders demonstrated their acceptance 
of, even commitment to, major economic restructuring. The government grew 
bolder in implementing orthodox monetarist policies which combatted inflation 
with great success; but which generated tremendous social and economic costs. 
During its first two years the Chamorro government took major steps of 
privatisation, demobilised half the army and laid off thousands of state workers, 
going far to reverse 'the conquests of the revolution'. 
In 1990 GNP fell by another 5 per cent. Monetary stability was achieved in 
the midst of a sharp decline in real output. As banks severely curtailed credit to 
large and small enterprises alike, manufacturing and agricultural production 
collapsed. The objective of the Chamorro group's economic policy was to 
reinstate Nicaragua into the good graces of the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund. In this it showed success. In 1991 the government signed 
agreements with both agencies which promised to pave the way for multilateral 
and private loans, fulfilling the economic objectives of the last years of 
Sandinista rule. 
The electoral defeat and the alliance with the Chamorro faction broke the 
superficial unity of the FSLN. For the first time since its founding, ideological 
and political debate within the Frente was publicly acknowledged. Sergio 
Ramirez, Vice-President in the Sandinista government and subsequently head of 
the FSLN bench in the National Assembly, explicitly defended the alliance on 
the grounds that economic restructuring was a necessary pre-condition for 
stability and growth. For Ramirez, the Chamorro group represented 'modern 
capitalists' attempting to reform Nicaragua, whose pursuit of stability and 
development called for FSLN support.69 This face of the Sandinista leadership 
reflected an amalgam of their ambiguous ideological heritage, their electoral 
defeat, and the new economic and political world order of the 1990s. 
The alliance and pronouncements of Sandinista leaders represented politics 
at the surface, among the political elite. There was no concertacion at the 
grassroots. Neither of the partners could claim a strong political base. Once no 
longer in control of the government, the National Directorate's lines of authority 
to the masses became increasingly tenuous. The ability of the FSLN leaders to 
direct mass protest was increasingly illusionary and illusory. Shortly after the 
May 1990 strike, the Frente Sandinista held an assembly of its leaders at El 
Crucero, at which acrimonious divisions manifested themselves.70 The first 
party congress, initially scheduled for early 1991, was postponed to July. When 
finally held, by re-electing the National Directorate, it apparently confirmed the 
power and prestige of the party's traditional leadership.71 But this further 
undermined the credibility and support of the leaders, and of the FSLN as a 
whole, both in the eyes of many of its members and for a majority of 
Nicaraguans. 
With weak links to the Nicaraguan masses and divided within itself, the 
FSLN leadership lacked the means to direct the course of events. Commentators 
repeatedly characterised the FSLN as the largest political party in Nicaragua and 
the one with the strongest mass support. While true, this characterisation 
reflected the general weakness of political organisation in the country, rather 
than the strength of the Sandinistas. 
Although the UNO won a stunning electoral victory, no one party in its 
coalition could claim substantial grassroots organisation. The UNO won because 
it united to oppose a government presiding over a costly war and national 
economic disintegration. This motivation could not serve as a source of loyalty 
once in control of the government. Soon after the election the UNO was no 
longer a coalition at all, but two bitterly divided factions, each of which enjoyed 
little cohesion and less organised mass support. The President herself claimed 
no party affiliation, nor did many of her close advisors. If the Sandinista links 
to the masses were to a great extent illusory, the UNO lack even illusion. 
While 'Sandinista-Chamorrista' cooperation gave Nicaragua a government, 
this government did not rule effectively over the population. The powerlessness 
of the government manifested itself most clearly in conflicts in the countryside, 
usually over land. The most potentially explosive of these occurred in the former 
war zones, where the counter-revolution had enjoyed support and the population 
was still armed. Struggles over land were no longer channeled along 
conventional political lines. The demobilised contra (the so-called Nicaraguan 
Resistance),72 former landowners, demobilised soldiers from the Sandinista 
army, members of so-called Sandinista cooperatives, all attempted to seize land 
or protect what they had. These conflicts took on ominous significance when 
Commander 'Franklyn', a leading contra, announced in January 1991 that his 
followers would rearm in retaliation for what he considered the government's 
inactivity in distributing land. This threat indicated the chaotic state of politics, 
since 'Franklyn' received Sandinista support for his demands that land be given 
to his ex-combatants. In 1991 people identified as Sandinistas joined with 
erstwhile counter-revolutionaries in different areas of the country to challenge 
the land policy of a government with which the national leadership of the FSLN 
was allied. The land struggles prompted a leader of UN AG to warn that 'the 
countryside has virtually become a no man's land'.73 
In the context of this gulf between the facade of government and the anarchy 
of the nation, Nicaragua, perhaps for the first time in its history, entered into a 
period of overt class conflict. The most conflictual focus of this struggle was 
land. Less immediately explosive but increasingly contentious became the issue 
of privatisation of non-agricultural enterprises, where in a growing number of 
cases workers occupied the plants and/or demanded ownership. Faced with this 
demand - and with its political allies in the government pressing for return of 
land and factories to their old owners - the FSLN adopted the vague slogan, 
'privatisation must benefit everyone', presumably an up-dating of the political 
philosophy of the 'logic of the majority'. However, it was obvious to everyone 
that no government policy could be found that would benefit all, particularly 
with the economy contracting and civil order precarious. 
Conclusion: The FSLN at the Moment of Decision 
Beyond quoting Sandino's famous statement, 'only the workers and peasants 
endure to the end', the FSLN in power avoided defining either its goals or the 
nature of Nicaraguan society in class terms. Notwithstanding this aversion, while 
it held government power the Frente objectively served the interests of the lower 
classes, particularly the rural poor and smallholders. To the peasantry it granted 
land, and, more important, it reduced the power of the landed oligarchy and 
capitalists. If it did both reluctantly and by acts of omission rather than 
commission, this does not reduce their importance. 
With respect to the working class, the role of the Frente in power proved 
much more ambiguous and conflictual. Throughout most of the Sandinista 
decade strikes were illegal and workers had little alternative to accepting the 
dubious leadership of the 'sweetheart' Sandinista national union. Further, real 
wages outside the civil service fell catastrophically.74 On the other hand, 
repression of working class dissent was relatively mild and carried out with the 
same vacillation and ambiguity that characterised all government policy save the 
conduct of the war against the contra. Most important, the revolutionary process 
sparked in the Nicaraguan working class a sense of its potential political power 
while, at the same time, substantially reducing the strength of the capitalists. 
In addition to objectively fostering the interests of the lower classes, the 
Frente in power never deviated from its commitment to anti-imperialism. The 
historical legacy of this commitment, in a country dominated by the United 
States for decades, could not be stressed too much, for it fundamentally changed 
the nature of Nicaraguan politics. For example, one could only explain Violeta 
Chamorro's willingness to resist US pressure on many issues large and small by 
the context created by Sandinista anti-imperialism. 
Out of power the Frente faced a different change. With the propertied classes 
controlling the government, the capitalists and landlords were in possession of 
the means to reconstruct their lost power. The conflicts over land and over 
privatisation represented the first skirmishes in their attempted reconquest of 
hegemony. This represented a class-based struggle that could not be managed 
in terms of patriots and traitors or majorities and minorities. Indeed, the 
ahistorical and eclectic language of nationalism served to facilitate the 
reconstruction of rule by the propertied classes, concealing the heart of the 
conflict - control of land and other means of production. The primary role of 
conflict over property did not represent an interpretation imposed by the political 
left, but rather a fact of life. By early 1991 it was clear that control of land and 
factories in Nicaragua would change hands; the uncertainty lay in what manner 
this change would occur, how rapidly, and to whose benefit. 
By the end of 1991 it was clear that the political elite of all leanings had 
sacrificed the fiction of the 'logic of the majority' to cement the country's 
reincorporation into the international financial community and to re-establish 
Nicaragua's traditional relationship with the government of the United States. In 
exchange for promises of loans from the World Bank, the Inter-American 
Development Bank and the US Agency for International Development, the 
Chamorro government accelerated the tempo of privatisations, doing so with the 
de facto acquiescence of the Sandinista leadership. 
In early 1991 a national commission which included representatives of the 
executive, the FSLN leadership, the business community (COSEP), and the 
National Workers' Federation (FNT), agreed that 'workers control' would take 
the form of employees owning 25 per cent of the shares of former state 
enterprises. This, of course, represented a far cry from the previous policies of 
the FSLN. By the end of the year the government selectively reneged on this 
concession, so that workers in a number of factories went on strike to obtain 
even this gesture towards worker ownership. While workers battled for their 25 
per cent, the political elite battled over the law which would formalise private 
property. Both the Sandinista leadership and the various factions of the UNO 
agreed that private property would predominate in the economy, with the issue 
being the degree of privatisation. Alfredo Cesar, leading UNO's right wing, 
focused on the return of property to former owners while Chamorro and the 
Sandinista leadership emphasised a compromise which would include workers 
gaining 25 per cent of nominal ownership. 
At the same time the government dismantled the Sandinista Army and Police, 
which had formerly been symbols of 'peoples' power'. The Sandinista Police 
became the National Police, a change of name which seemed to mirror a 
changed ideology. In 1991 the police regularly clashed with striking workers to 
enforce the government's privatisation decrees. Arnoldo Aleman, Mayor of 
Managua and major figure on the far right, by the end of the year called for the 
creation of a parallel repressive apparatus in the form of local police forces 
which would be directly responsible to the mayors, many of whom represented 
UNO's right wing. While the political elite discussed the nuances of restoring 
the rule of the old order, throughout the country groups rearmed in response to 
disputes over the ownership of land. These groups tended to be labelled on the 
basis of their former roles in the armed struggle (re-contras and re-compas). 
After the election a number of critics of the Sandinistas decried what they 
saw as developing social democratic philosophy and practice on the part of the 
leadership of the Frente. In terms of the Frente continuing its role as the vehicle 
of progressive change in Nicaragua, the danger was more profound. The political 
rhetoric of class has never been the monopoly of revolutionary parties; it also 
characterises social democracy, which historically served as the reformist party 
of the working class. Once out of power and avoiding a class definition of itself, 
there was the real and present danger that the Frente would abandon not only 
revolution, but also social democracy. Having in power presided over rising 
class consciousness, the FSLN might in opposition become a barrier to the 
further mobilisation of the lower classes. Unfortunately, there are many 
examples in Latin America of such a transformation of a political movement: the 
APRA in Peru, the MNR (Movimiento National Revolucionario) in Bolivia, and 
the PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institutionalizado) in Mexico. 
The Nicaraguan revolution, which brought insurrection in the late 1970s as 
its first phase, had yet to run its course in the early 1990s. What course it would 
take in great part lay outside the control of the FSLN or of any other political 
group in Nicaragua. In the 1970s Nicaraguan society entered a period of 
transition that would stretch, at the least, to the end of the century. As Marx 
wrote, 
...[0]ne cannot judge... a period of transformation by its consciousness, 
but, on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained from the 
contradictions of material life...75 
If the broad trend of Nicaraguan history lay outside the control of the Frente 
Sandinista, the FSLN still faced the challenge of relating itself to that trend, to 
give it coherence and leadership, or to be swept along in its wake. 
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